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Observation inflation and interrogative suggestibility:  
Different but related memory errors 
Abstract: The observation inflation effect consists in the fact that observing an action being performed can create false 
memories that this action has actually been performed by the observer. The present study examined the relationship 
between this effect and interrogative suggestibility. A procedure based on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale was used 
to assess two kinds of suggestibility: the tendency to yield to suggestive questions (Yield) and the tendency to change 
answers after feedback (Shift). The participants first watched a film depicting a woman performing simple activities and 
performed various activities themselves during the film. In order to determine whether the observation inflation effect 
occurred, the participants performed a source-monitoring test. The observation inflation effect was replicated. 
Observation inflation correlated positively with Yield but not with Shift. This pattern of results can be explained by the 
fact these two indicators are different aspects of interrogative suggestibility. Shift is more related to social influence, 
while Yield is more cognitive in its nature. 
Keywords: observation inflation; interrogative suggestibility, memory, feedback   
Introduction 
Interrogative suggestibility (IS) is one of the major 
threats to the quality of human testimony (Gudjonsson, 
2003), and consequently, it may contribute to erroneous 
decisions on the part of the court. Indeed, Huff, Rattner 
and Sagarin (1996) suggested that the most common 
reason for the conviction of innocent people was, in fact, 
false and unreliable eyewitness testimonies. Given this 
fact, the present research is aimed to increase knowledge 
about IS, and more specifically, to study whether the so 
called observation inflation (OI) is a correlate of it. 
We will start by presenting imagination inflation, 
a phenomenon on the basis of which OI was developed, 
then we will introduce OI itself, afterwards we will 
describe IS, and present our own hypotheses. 
Imagining a self-reported counterfactual event in-
creases confidence that this event actually happened 
(Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996). This 
phenomenon is called imagination inflation and was first 
described by Garry and colleagues (Garry et. al., 1996). In 
their experiment, participants rated the probability of many 
different possible childhood events occurring. Two weeks 
later, the participants were asked to create a detailed 
picture of some of the events that received low subjective 
probabilities in their individual assessments. Finally, the 
participants reassessed how confident they were that these 
events had happened in their lives. It was found that 
imagining low-probability events increased the confidence 
that these events actually took place. Since this first study, 
research has consequently shown that imagining the details 
of an event that never happened or an activity that was 
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never self-performed is enough to produce false memories 
about them (Garry, Frame, & Loftus, 1999; Goff & 
Roediger, 1998; Heaps & Nash, 1999; Horselenberg et al., 
2000; Paddock et al., 1998; Sharman, Garry, & Bueke, 
2004; Thomas, Bulevich, & Loftus, 2003).  
Increased confidence that an activity has been 
performed could result not only from imagining self- 
performance, but also from merely observing when other 
people perform a given activity. This kind of confusion 
over whether one indeed performed an action or only 
watched it is referred to as the observation inflation effect 
(OI). Lindner, Echterhoff, Davidson, and Brand (2010) 
conducted a series of experiments in which participants 
performed simple actions or read action statements (e.g.,  
shake the bottle). Later, they observed an actor perform 
several actions, some of which the participants had not 
performed earlier. Two weeks later, a source memory test 
was conducted - participants indicated whether they had 
or had not performed each activity described in the 
statements. It was found that observation of other- 
performed actions induced false memories of self- 
performance. This effect was successively replicated in 
several studies (Lindner, Schain, & Echterhoff, 2016; 
Lindner, Schain, Kopietz, & Echterhoff, 2012; Schain, 
Lindner, Beck, & Echterhoff, 2012) and also when 
a different experimental paradigm was used (Lange, 
Hollins, & Bach, 2017). This successful conceptual 
replication of the OI effect was conducted in a new 
paradigm: in pairs, the participants and confederates took 
turns creating various geometric shapes and letters with 
their own bodies. The next day, participants were asked to 
recall either actions they had performed or those they had 
observed. Not only the inflation observation effect was 
confirmed, but also the reverse error was observed: 
participants reported their own actions as those of their 
partners (Lange et al., 2017). 
The observation inflation effect involves confusion 
over whether an action was actually been performed or 
was merely observed. This relates to the social nature of 
memory (Lindner et al., 2012). It has been found that the 
observation inflation effect is moderated by the skin color 
of the person performing the activity. The effect was 
reduced when the actor’s skin color was different than the 
participant’s skin color (Linder et al., 2012). Other 
research shows that the observation inflation effect is 
decreased if the face of the person performing the activity 
is visible to participants (vs. the condition where only the 
activity is visible; Schain et al., 2012). Attention is 
indicated as one of the determinants of the observation 
inflation effect: the effect disappears when attention is not 
focused on the actor performing a given action (Kashihara, 
Kanayama, Miyatani, & Nakao, 2017). Another character-
istic related to the observation inflation effect is age: both 
young and old adults are prone to this phenomenon, but the 
magnitude of this effect is greater in those who are older 
(Lindner & Davidson, 2014).  
Further research focused on the mechanisms under-
lying the OI effect. This mechanism seems to be different 
from the one responsible for the imagination inflation 
effect, which is most likely caused by a source-monitoring 
error (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Libby, 
2003). In the case of observation inflation, the research 
indicates that motor simulation during action observation 
might be the core mechanism underlying false memories 
of self-performance that are captured by this effect 
(Lindner et al., 2016; cf. results inconsistent with this 
interpretation Lange et al., 2017). The corroboration for 
this thesis was provided by Lindner et al. (2016). In their 
first experiment from this study, the observation inflation 
effect occurred even when stimuli were reduced to motion 
cues (the video showing the performance of the activities 
was perceptually impoverished). In the second experiment, 
it was found that performing incongruent as compared to 
congruent movements (in order to prevent motor simula-
tion) decreased the observation inflation effect. 
The second main construct researched in the present 
study, interrogative suggestibility (IS) is defined as “the 
extent to which, within a closed social interaction, people 
come to accept messages communicated during formal 
questioning, as a result of which their subsequent 
behavioral response is affected” (Gudjonsson & Clark, 
1986, p. 84). IS comprises two main factors: Yield, which 
is the tendency to include in answers details congruent 
with suggestions included in misleading questions; and 
Shift: the tendency to give different answers as a result of 
negative feedback (Gudjonsson, 1984). The theory of IS is 
based on three constructs (Gudjonsson, 1997): uncertainty, 
interpersonal trust, and expectation to succeed. Uncertainty 
refers to the interviewee being unsure of the correct answer 
to a question. Interpersonal trust means that an average 
witness usually does not doubt the interviewer’s truthful-
ness or suspect that they will convey incorrect information 
or otherwise mislead them. Expectation to succeed refers 
to the interviewee’s conviction that they will know the 
answers to the questions asked (Gudjonsson, 1997). When 
all these three premises are present, most people will be 
suggestible to some extent (Gudjonsson, 1997).  
Aim of the study and hypotheses 
The main aim of the present study was to examine 
whether there is a relationship between susceptibility to OI 
and IS. We predicted that there would be a positive 
correlation. The rationale for this hypothesis is based on 
following premises. First, both OI and IS involve and 
assume imperfect memory. In the context of IS, it has been 
repeatedly confirmed that memory quality is a negative 
predictor of IS (e.g. Gudjonsson, 1987, 1988; Polczyk et 
al., 2004). In connection with IOs we are not aware of such 
research, but it can be reasonably assumed that poor 
memory contributes to this effect. If this is the case, 
a positive correlation between IO and IS should be 
expected. 
Another common denominator for OI and IS is 
memory confidence. Uncertainty of memory is essential 
for IS (Gudjonsson, 1997) and is in fact included in the 
theory of IS - as above mentioned, uncertainty of one's 
memory is a core premise for IS: people who are 
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completely confident in their memories have very low or 
no IS (Gudjonsson, 1997). We speculated that memory 
confidence is related to OI as well: people who are very 
confident in their memories should be less prone to this 
effect. 
Apart from the above mentioned premises, OI may be 
considered a kind of susceptibility to suggestion, just as IS: 
someone observed something and then it is suggested to 
them that they did it themselves by means of questions 
which apparently allow for a possibility that a given action 
was performed (while actually it was merely observed).  
In order to measure IS we developed a technique 
which was based on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales 
(GSS; Gudjonsson, 1997). GSS involves negative feed-
back. We decided to include positive feedback in the 
experiment as well. Although not included in the standard 
GSS procedure, it is nevertheless relevant in the case of 
a forensic interview, and its impact may vary depending on 
the subject's previous behaviour. Gudjonsson (2003) 
analyzed four settings: (1) suggestible behavioural re-
sponse followed by positive feedback; (2) resistant 
behavioural response followed by positive feedback; 
(3) resistant behavioural response followed by negative 
feedback, and (4) suggestible behavioural response 
followed by negative feedback. In the first setting positive 
feedback should reinforce the suggestible behaviour of the 
witness, while in the second setting it would reinforce 
resistant behaviour. In sum, the effects of positive and 
negative feedback may be different, so we decided to study 
both of them.  
Method 
Power analysis 
Power analysis was done by means of the G*Power 
software (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). A 2 × 
2 ANOVA with within-subjects factors was planned, as 
well as correlational analyses. As for the ANOVA, the 
current version of G*Power (3.1.9.6) cannot do power 
analyses for repeated measures designs with more than one 
within-subject factor and their interaction. Because of this, 
the power was estimated for the main effects, as if there was 
one factor only. Correlation between repeated measures was 
assumed to by r = 0.5. For the small, medium and large 
effect sizes (f = 0.1, 0.25, and 0.4, respectively), the required 
sample size for the power of 80% was 327, 54, and 23. Thus, 
the planned sample (N = 62) was big enough to detect 
medium and large effect sizes. 
As for correlations, one-tailed significance tests and 
power of 80% were assumed. Pearson rs equalling 0.1, 0.3, 
and 0.5 were assumed as small, medium, and large effect 
sizes, respectively. The required sample sizes were 614, 
64, and 21, respectively. Obviously, the assumed sample 
size (62 participants) was appropriate to detect medium 
and large effects, but not a small one. This applies to the 
correlational analysis involving Yield (see description od 
Yield and Shift below). As for Shift, the situation is worse, 
as there were two kinds of feedback and therefore two 
groups of 31 participants. This sample only allows for 
detecting large effects and therefore insignificant correla-
tions should be interpreted with caution in this case. 
However, given the complexity of the experimental 
procedure and scarcity of resources, a substantially larger 
sample was not possible. 
Participants 
The 62 people (33 women and 29 men) who 
participated in the study were invited to take part via 
social networks. Their average age was 26.34 (SD = 9.95). 
The participants did not receive any money or other 
gratification for participating in the study. 
Materials 
Observation inflation. The study used a film without 
sound lasting 14 minutes and 20 seconds. The film 
alternated between presenting various activities performed 
by an actress, such as opening a box or touching an ear, 
and instructions for the subjects. To minimize gender 
conformity, the actress wore gender neutral clothes and her 
hands and her face were made to look gender neutral 
(i.e. nails were not painted, her hair was short). The 
participants were asked, for example, to close the box or 
touch their nose. They had 10 second to complete each 
action. The participants carried out the commands 
displayed on the film using the items on the table on their 
left side (it was irrelevant which hand was dominant or 
which hand the participants performed the activity) Such 
location of the table was derived from the research of 
Lindner et al. (2010). The objects on the table were 
identical to those shown in the film. However, the 
participants were asked to use only some of them. In 
addition, there were also items that were shown only on 
the film and the participant was not asked to use them. 
There were also items on the table that were not shown in 
the film, and the participants were not asked to use them. 
The source memory test contained 30 statements 
describing activities such as opening a box, and the res-
pondents were asked to mark one of four answers: a) I did 
it, b) I watched it, c) I did it and watched it, d) I neither did 
it nor watched it. It was clearly explained that the option 
'I did it' was to be chosen only if the participant believed 
that they were doing an action but were not seeing the 
actress doing it. Fifteen statements contained critical 
details and concerned activities performed exclusively in 
the film. Answers I did it or I did it and I watched it 
relating to critical items were considered to be the 
occurrence of the observation inflation phenomenon. For 
example, the participants watched the actress open the box 
on film but did not do it themselves. The answer to the 
question about opening the box 'I did it' or 'I did it and 
I watched it' indicated the OI effect. 
Based on the 15 critical items, two indexes were 
calculated: the first was based on the number of “I did it” 
answers; the second was based on the number of “I did it 
and watched it” answers (they do not sum up to 100% as 
two other answers were always possible). The first index 
indicates observation inflation in a ‘stronger’ sense, which 
indicates that a participant thought they had done some-
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thing and did not realize that they had also watched it. The 
second index still indicates that OI was present, but here 
the participant realized that they had watched an activity, 
although they wrongly believed that they had also 
performed it. The first, stronger index was called OI-d 
(doing); the second, weaker one was called OI-wd 
(watching and doing). OI-d and OI-w were also computed 
for the control questions, which referred to activities which 
had never been watched in order to provide a control 
condition for the OI effect. 
The main aim of the study was to analyze the 
correlation between the IO and the IS, rather than an in- 
depth analysis of the OI effect itself. In order to ensure the 
highest possible reliability of the measurement of OI, it 
was based on as many items as possible (15). This was at 
the expense of the number of control items (3), which only 
served to confirm that the effect of the OI existed at all. 
The use of a very large number of control items was not 
possible because it would have made the procedure too 
long. As there were 15 critical items and only three control 
items, the results were expressed as means. The answers 
were coded as 0 = observation inflation not endorsed, and 
1 = observation inflation endorsed. Thus, the scores had 
ranges from zero to 1.  
Interrogative suggestibility. The procedure for 
measuring IS was based on the GSS (Gudjonsson, 1997) 
but was modified in order to be better integrated in the 
procedure. In the original GSS, a story is read aloud to the 
participants, and after a break, 20 questions are being 
asked, 15 of which include misleading cues. The number 
of answers consistent with the misleading cues constitutes 
Yield - the tendency to give answers consistent with 
misleading premises included in the questions. After all the 
questions are asked, negative feedback follows, and all 
questions are asked again. The number of changes in the 
answers constitutes Shift - the tendency to change answers 
after negative feedback.  
In the present experiment, instead of a story, the film 
described above served as the material to be remembered. 
The testing phase consisted of 20 questions and two answers 
to choose from. Fifteen of the questions and the options for 
answers were suggestive; e.g. 'On which finger did the 
actress have a ring while hitting the table? - On the middle 
finger / On the ring finger?', while in fact the woman shown 
in the movie did not have any ring. The remaining five 
questions were buffers, that is, an answer based on the film 
was possible and the question did not suggest anything. 
Each answer consistent with the misleading sugges-
tion was scored one point. In total, a maximum of 15 
points could be obtained on the Yield scale (the tendency 
to give in to misleading cues). Afterwards, feedback was 
applied. The negative version was as follows: 'You have 
made a number of errors, therefore please complete the 
test again, and this time try to be more accurate'. The 
positive feedback was: 'You did very well, you have made 
few errors, so please complete the test again and try to find 
them'. Each answer clearly different from the previous one 
was scored one point, giving the index of Shift (the 
tendency to change answers) with a range from 0 to 20. 
Procedure 
The participants were informed that they are taking 
part in a memory study. In the first part, the subjects 
watched a film that alternately depicted a woman perform-
ing various activities and instructions for the subjects to 
carry out using the items on the table on their left side. 
Some commands were supposed to be done using only 
their own hands, e.g. 'touch your nose with your finger' or 
'bang your fist on the table'. After the movie finished, all 
items on the table were covered. Immediately after the film 
ended, the respondents were asked to list all the activities: 
both those seen in the film and those which they had been 
asked to perform. This part served to authenticate the 
purpose of the study and to provide the experimenter with 
an initial estimate of the memory capacity of the subjects. 
After recalling all the activities that the subject was able to 
remember a 50-minute break followed during which the 
participants filled out a number of questionnaires not 
related to the subject of the study. 
After the break, the subjects were again asked to list 
all the activities from the first part of the experiment. They 
then completed the information source memory test 
concerning OI. Afterwards, they performed the memory 
test concerning IS: they were asked to complete a memory 
test consisting of 20 questions, including misleading 
questions as described above. Next, regardless of the 
result obtained, for half of the participants positive and for 
the other half negative feedback was given and the 
participants answered all 20 questions again. Finally, the 
participants were debriefed. 
Results 
First of all, the presence of the observation inflation 
effect was analyzed. To analyze the it, a two-factor 
analysis of variance was applied with two within-subjects 
factors: OI-manipulation (critical vs. control questions) × 
OI-type (OI-d vs. OI-wd). The means across experimental 
conditions are presented in Table 1. 
The main effect of observation inflation proved 
significant (means: 0.32 vs. 0.01; F(1, 61) = 452.64, 
p < .001, η2 = .88). As can be seen, the number of answers 
indicating that a participant believed that they had 
performed an activity (while in fact they had only watched 
it) was extremely low in the control condition (about 1% of 
items endorsed). The main effect of the type of the OI (OI- 
d vs. OI-wd) was also significant, with OI-wd being much 
Table 1. Mean numbers of answers mentioning ‘doing’ an 
activity (standard errors) across experimental conditions  
Critical items Control items Total 
OI-d 0.08 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 
OI-wd 0.56 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.29 (0.01) 
Total 0.32 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)   
OI-d, observation inflation – doing; OI-wd, observation inflation 
– watching and doing 
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more endorsed than OI-w (means: 0.29 vs. 0.04; F(1, 61) = 
474.51, p < .001, η2 = .89). The interaction of the OI- 
manipulation and OI-type factors was also significant (F(1, 
61) = 449.86, p < .001 , η2 = .88). Subsequent analyses of 
simple effects indicated that the differences between 
critical and control items were significant for both OI-d 
(F(1, 61) = 27.81, p < .001 , η2 = .31) and OI-wd (F(1, 61) 
= 588.34, p < .001, η2 = .91). In sum, these results confirm 
the existence of the OI effect, although it was much 
stronger in the case of the less strict measure. 
As mentioned above, OI-d was very rare and close to 
floor effects. This inevitably restricts its range and may 
cause correlational effects to be insignificant. Following 
analyses were performed for both OI-wd and OI-d, but the 
results for OI-d should be treated with great caution. 
The next hypothesis concerned the relationship 
between OI and IS. Table 2 presents the results of Pearson 
r correlations concerning these hypotheses. As for Shift, it 
was calculated separately for the positive and negative 
feedback. 
In accordance with the hypothesis, yielding to 
suggestive cues was positively related to the tendency to 
give in to observation inflation; however, this was the case 
only with observation inflation measured in the less 
stringent way. No significant correlations were found 
between OI and the tendency to change answers after 
feedback. Thus, the hypothesis postulating a relationship 
between OI and IS was only partially confirmed. 
Finally, it was found that Shift was much higher in the 
case of negative than positive feedback (means: 4.58 vs. 
1.51, SD: 3.17 and 1.73; t(60) = 4.58; p < .001, η2 = .26). 
Discussion 
The present study first sought to replicate the 
observation inflation effect (OI), which means increased 
confidence that a participant performed a given activity 
when in fact they only watched another person doing it. 
The main aim was to analyze the correlations between the 
tendency to give in to OI and both aspects of interrogative 
suggestibility (IS), which is the tendency to give answers 
consistent with misleading suggestive cues included in 
questions, and the tendency to change answers after being 
given feedback concerning the answers given so far. 
OI was operationalized in two ways in the present 
study: as ‘I did it’ and ‘I did it and watched it’ answers. In 
the first case, OI was measured more strictly as a belief 
that a participant thought they had performed a given 
activity without realizing that they had merely watched it. 
In the second case, OI is operationalized less strictly, as in 
this case participants knew that they had watched a given 
activity being performed by somebody else but also 
erroneously believe that they had also performed it. 
The OI effect was present in the case of both these 
kinds of operationalization. This confirms its replicability. 
The present results also mean that the OI effect can be 
elicited in various ways, as the details of our experimental 
procedure differ somewhat from that applied by Lindner et 
al. (2010), e.g. no reading aloud of the actions or 
unscrambling of them was applied. Also, in the study by 
Lindner et al. (2010), the procedure actually consisted of 
two parts: Phase 1 – encoding of actions (performed vs. 
only read vs. not presented); next, after two weeks; Phase 2 
– presentation (presented vs. not presented) and processing 
(observed vs. imagined vs. generated vs. read). In the 
present study, a much simpler procedure was used. Most 
importantly, no two-week time delay was applied, and 
instead 50 minutes separated the first phase (watching vs. 
doing) and the final source memory test. Also, Lindner et 
al. (2010) did not differentiate between the more and less 
strict way of measuring OI. Despite these rather substantial 
procedural differences, we were able to replicate the main 
idea of OI. Existing replications of OI (Lange et al., 2017; 
Lindner et al., 2012, 2016; Schain et al., 2012) also 
differed somewhat from the original procedure used by 
Lindner et al. (2010). This confirms the universality of this 
effect. 
Of course, calling the OI-d and OI-wd options as 
indicators of a stricter and a more lenient manifestations of 
OI is a metaphor only. The results however are comparable 
to a similar source monitoring test, concerning the memory 
misinformation effect. In this paradigm (e.g. Zaragoza & 
Lane, 1994), the participants watched a film and read 
a summary of it, in which details that were not actually on 
the film were mentioned, e.g. a gun. The final source 
monitoring test forced the participants to choose one of 
four options: 'Saw' (i.e. it was on the film), 'Saw and read' 
(it was on the film and in the text), 'Read' (it was in the text 
but not on the film), and 'Neither' (it was neither on the 
film nor in the text). The first and second answers were 
considered to be indicators that misinformation has 
affected memory. The option indicating that the participant 
thought they have seen something they have actually only 
read about and did not realize that they have read about it, 
occurred rarely (Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). 
The main hypothesis verified in the present study 
stated that the tendency to give in to the observation 
inflation effect would be positively related to interrogative 
suggestibility. As for Yield, this hypothesis was confirmed 
in the case of the less strict measure of OI. This may be 
explained by the fact that in the case of the stricter measure 
(the belief that one performed an activity without realizing 
that it was only observed) the mean was very close to zero 
Table 2. Correlations between observation inflation and 
interrogative suggestibility  
IO-wd IO-d 
Yield .30* .05 
Shift - positive feedback .15 -.04 
Shift - negative feedback .01 -.07  
OI-d, observation inflation – doing; OI-wd, observation inflation 
– watching and doing 
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(0.08, compared with 0.56 in the case of the less strict 
measure). Therefore, its variance was limited, and as 
Pearson’s r coefficient is very sensitive to the variance of 
both variables being correlated, no significant effect was 
present. In the case of Shift, however, no significant 
relationships were found at all.  
The fact that OI was related to Yield but not to the 
Shift may be explained by the fact that they are actually 
very different aspects of interrogative suggestibility. Yield 
is more cognitive in its nature, while Shift is more related 
to social influence. In the case of Yield, the participant 
may have actually been unaware that they had been 
subjected to any sort of influence or suggestion. Relying 
on suggestive cues included in the interviewer’s questions 
is probably more similar to filling gaps in memory. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, three elements are essential 
for interrogative suggestibility to arise (Gudjonsson, 
1997): uncertainty, interpersonal trust, and expectation to 
succeed. All these factors foster relying on (mis)informa-
tion included in the questions, not only in the original 
story. However, the participant may be not aware that any 
pressure is present. Thus, a correlation between observa-
tion inflation and relying on additional cues is under-
standable because both assume a certain inadequacy in 
a cognitive function, namely memory. 
Things start to be different in the case of Shift. Here 
the participant is overtly ‘informed’ about their level of 
performance. In the classical operationalization of IS, i.e. 
GSS scales (Gudjonsson, 1997), the feedback is negative; 
in the present study, positive feedback was also applied in 
one of the groups. Negative feedback usually results in 
reduced self-esteem and confidence and increased ten-
dency to change answers in order to achieve ‘better’ 
results. This may be unrelated to observation inflation, in 
which no overt influence of any kind, especially no 
feedback, is present. As for positive feedback, it may not 
cause increased tendency to change answers, but it is still 
a kind of feedback. As the observation inflation procedure 
did not include any feedback, this may explain the lack of 
correlation in this case.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
One of the limitations of the present study is the fact 
that a simplified procedure for analyzing the observation 
inflation effect was applied. Such simplification was 
necessary because the experiment involved another 
procedure which is also quite complicated, namely, 
measuring interrogative suggestibility. Both these proce-
dures are quite challenging for both the participants and 
the experimenter, so they were simplified as much as 
possible. 
In the OI procedure, no counterbalancing between 
critical and control items was applied, and the procedure 
included more critical items than control items. We did it 
this way because one of the main aims of the present study 
was to analyze the relationship between the tendency to be 
susceptible to observation inflation and interrogative 
suggestibility. The longer scale ensured better reliability 
and larger variance, resulting in better power to detect 
correlations. It can be noted that no counterbalancing is 
applied also in the classical procedure for measuring 
interrogative suggestibility, the Gudjonsson Suggestibility 
Scales (Gudjonsson, 1997), on which the present proce-
dure was based. 
The statement that Yield is linked to IOs may have 
some consequences for the applied forensic psychology 
applied and especially for research in this area. Perhaps in 
order to assess the susceptibility of a witness to suggestive 
questions it is worth to do other tests, examining the 
susceptibility to various other distortions of cognitive 
processes, including IOs. In any case, it is worthwhile to 
do further research to analyze what other types of 
cognitive distortions may be related to the tendency to 
yield to suggestive questions. 
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